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Mental Age

Mental Illness, Models of. Although the concept
of mental illness is central to the field of mental
health and the practice of counseling, there is continuing disagreement about its definition. Several
views are widely held. Each h as important implications for understanding mental illness, determining which conditions are disorders and who
has them, and choosing appropriate approaches to
treatment. This controversy involves several important issues.
In a recent review, Wakefield (1992) presents a
summary of the different approaches to defining
mental illness. They include the views that mental
disorder is a myth, purely a value concept, whatever professionals treat, statistical deviance, disadvantage, unexpectable distress or disability, or
harmful dysfunction. Wakefield prefers the harmful dysfunction approach, which he believes is essentially identical with common conceptions of
physical illness. Several of Wakefield's major points
are summarized.
Psychiatrist Thomas Szasz contends that mental illness is a myth. Central to the illness model is
the notion that biological lesions and disorders go
together. However, physical lesions are possible
without constituting a disorder (e.g., albinism,
webbed toes), and disorders may occur without a
known lesion (e.g., trigeminal neuralgia, senile pruritus) . Szasz believes a few mental disorders are
based on biological causes. The rest, he contends,
are merely evaluative labels that legitimize social
sanctions and change efforts directed at persons
who do not behave in socially approved ways . Examples include labeling homosexuals, runaway
slaves (drapetomania), and social dissidents mentally disordered. Demonstrating abuses, however,
does not establish that mental disorder is a myth .
Evidence that schizophrenia occurs widely across
cultures strains the claim that mental disorder is
purely a value concept.
Limiting mental disorder to that which professionals treat also has problems. It implies that without treatment one does not have a disorder. Conversely, seeking treatment only to discover that one
is normal becomes impossible under this criterion.
Statistical deviance likewise fails. One can be deviant in both positive and negative ways, yet the statistical approach treats these as equally disordered.
Also, some disorders, such as high blood pressure,
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are statistically common. Statistical rareness is thus
inadequate. Defining disorder as negative deviation
helps-but it introduces values. Further, crimes, discourtesy, and moral transgressions, while undesirable, are not considered disorders .
Biological disadvantage, an evolutionary concept, labels as disorders those conditions that impair fertility or speed mortality, thus threatening
species survival. However, many disorders appear
to have neither of these consequences.
The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), or DSMrv, is based on the notion of unexpectable distress
or disability. Although harmful dysfunction provides the conceptual foundation, the criteria for
specific disorders are based on distress or disability and statistical infrequency. The problem is twofold,
Wakefield points out. First, normal reactions that
are statistically rare are defined by DSM-IV as disordered. Second, such unexpected conditions as
extreme misfortune and ignorance can cause distress and disability yet are excluded as mental disorders; DSM-IV describes some of these conditions
under the V codes.
Wakefield (1992) concludes that harmful dysfunction is the best definition of mental disorder.
Harmful dysfunction is a hybrid definition: "disorder must include a factual component . .. (and) disorder requires harm, which involves values" (p. 381 ).
For Wakefield the factual-scientific component of
disorder is based on evolutionary biology; that is,
disorder involves a failure of a human biological
system to perform its intended function in preserving the organism. Wakefield infers intended function from the effects of the system; it need not imply active agency such as that of a creator God. He
concludes "an evolutionary approach . .. is central
to an understanding of psychopathology. Dysfunction is thus a purely factual scientific concept"
(p . 383 ). In addition, "only dysfunctions that are socially disvalued are disorders" (p. 384 ). A key factor
is that "it is the nature of the cause of the symptoms,
and not the nature of the symptoms themselves, that
determines whether a disorder is mental" (p. 384).
Central to the concept of mental illness is the
notion that behavioral disturbances are in some
sense diseases. Although it is clearly no longer the
sole model, the disease model, or harmful dysfunction, remains the most widely accepted view.
The difficulty one faces in attempting to refer to
these phenomena without using terms connoting
illness reflects the pervasiveness of the disease/mental illness model.
Historical Perspective. From antiquity until the
late nineteenth century persons with deviant behavior were considered to be malingerers, a moral
concern, or to be possessed by spirits, a religious
concern. Exorcism and torture were used in an effort to remove the influence of evil spirits. Special
favor was given to benevolent spirits.
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Treatment of the mentally ill changed markedly
during the period from the late eighteenth century
through the time of Sigmund Freud. The humanitarian reforms under Phillipe Pinel, Tuke, and
Dorothea Lynde Dix resulted in modification of asylums. Greisinger and Morel advanced the disease
hypothesis. John Gray, editor of the American Journal ofInsanity from 1855 to 1885, insisted that physical lesions produced insanity and led in the transformation of mental asylums into treatment
facilities. The work of Jean-Martin Charcot, Pierre
Janet, Bernheim, and Freud led to a conceptual
shift; persons who had previously been considered
malingerers were subsequently diagnosed as hysterics. Thus the disease model was extended to
persons outside the institutional care setting.
Further credence was given to the disease model
by the dramatic discovery that advanced syphilitic
infection causes general paresis, a psychotic disorder. This hypothesis was first suggested in 185 7;
positive identification of syphilitic infection as the
causative agent was provided in 1913. Together
these movements culminated in a rnajor paradigm
shift in which the disease notion replaced moralreligious explanations.
The view that mental disorders are diseases has
been widely accepted in the twentieth century. However, there is considerable conceptual ambiguity
regarding the nature of the disease or medical
model. Blaney (1975) suggests four versions: mental disorders are physiologically based diseases; evidences of disorder are manifestations of an underlying condition (not necessarily organic); the
individual has no responsibility for his or her behavior; psychiatric symptoms can be best understood by ordering them into syndromes.
Alternative Models. A number of alternative
models have been advanced to replace the medical
model. Most widely accepted are the various sociopsychological or behavioral models. Sociopsychological models postulate that there is no radical discontinuity between normal and disturbed
behavior. The underlying mechanisms of behavior
are the processes of learning and behavior control.
Diagnosis is focused on identifying the frequencies,
topographies, and social or environmental conditions controlling problem behaviors (Kazdin, 1989).
The systems model locates the problem within
family and social systems rather than in the individual. For example, many contemporary family
therapists view parent-child problems as problems
of the system. Neither the parent nor the child is
identified as a patient who has the problem. Rather,
the problem arises from the interaction between
parent and child and may be significantly affected
by interactions with other family members or circumstances as well.
Culture and Mental Disorder. DSM-IV contains
an appendix that examines culture-related syndromes. Anorexia nervosa and chronic fatigue syndrome, disorders that are largely found in the United

States and Europe, remain in the main body of the
DSM, while ataques de nervois, a Latin American
disorder similar to hysteria, and tajin kyofusho, a
Japanese disorder similar to social phobia, are relegated to the appendix on culture-related disorders.
A study of Hopi culture reveals five conditions that
overlap with the DSM-IV criteria for depression,
although none fully fit: two conditions are translated worry sickness, others include unhappiness,
heartbrokenness, and drunkenlike craziness with
or without alcohol.
Two conclusions may be drawn. First, mental
disorders occur across cultural boundaries. Second,
the precise form of disorders varies across cultures,
with some disorders being very different and others fairly similar in varied cultures. Stix concludes
"although some diseases, such as schizophrenia, do
appear in all cultures, a number of others do not.
Moreover, the variants of an illness-and the course
they take-in different cultural settings may diverge
so dramatically that a physician may as well be treating separate diseases" (Stix, 1996, p. 16).
In a recent discussion of culture and mental disorders, Dana noted that there is a tendency to treat
cultural differences as pathology. He proposed that
cultural information is essential to reduce egregious misclassification. Dana went on to say, "DSM
is a very dangerous instrument, and it really is used
for social control. . .. It lumps together disease
(medical model) and cultural model etiologies"
(Dana, 1996).
Christian Perspective. Since a Christian approach is particularly concerned with ethical and
moral issues, the differences between a medical
and a sociopsychological conceptualization of mental illness have profound implications for a Christian perspective. In a medical conceptualization
the alcoholic, the depressive, the psychopathic, the
retarded, and other disordered individuals are seen
primarily as victims of processes outside their control. If the problem is viewed as a behavioral disorder, the individual's personal responsibility for
his or her present condition becomes a prominent
issue with clear moral implications. In reality the
issues may be even more complex, since contemporary research increasingly shows that personalsociallifestyle is a major contributing factor in contracting various physical diseases.
For many Christians, Wakefield's (1992) appeal
to evolutionary biology in explaining dysfunction
is objectionable. However, failure to perform a Godintended function is a plausible alternative. The
claim that dysfunction is purely factual fails, since
science is not possible without making prescientific assumptions, and any interpretation of scientific data inevitably mingles observations and assumptions. In the words of Bevan and Kessel (1994),
"most often implicit, ideologies are complex, not
easily broken into elements ... they are like sand
at a picnic: they get into everything ... to talk of
scholarship and science as separate from the life
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experience, the intentions, the values, the worldview, and social life of the people who create it is
to deny its fundamental character as a human activity" (p. 506).
While articulate presentations that are sensitive
to complex issues remain rare, the ramifications of
these models have not escaped Christian writers.
At one extreme Adams (1970) emphatically proclaims that all problems reflect either organic disorder or sin. Other writers recognize that sin and
organic disorders are only two of many potential
causes of psychological problems. Some causes include response to existential issues, maladaptive
use of defense mechanisms, demonic influence,
and learning (Cosgrove & Mallory, 1977).
All mental disorders-indeed, all problems in
our world-may ultimately be traced to the entry
of sin into the world and the subsequent disruption of the created order (cf. Rom. 8: 19-22). Thus
at one level it is accurate to say that the cause of
psychological problems is sin. However, viewing
the problem solely as personal sin is too simplistic. The effects of sin are manifested in mental disorders on at least three different levels: the effects
of personal sin leading to guilt or anxiety; the effects of sin in the world, resulting in various biological disorders such as genetic disorders, endocrinological malfunctions, disease, and traumas;
the effects of the sin of others, such as retardation
due to neglect or abuse by a parent and anxiety or
depression following an assault. In addition, we see
interactions among these factors, such as when a
person's abuse of alcohol or drugs results in brain
damage.
Ethical and moral issues have often been viewed
as largely irrelevant within the medical model of
mental illness. However, it is becoming increasingly
clear that moral issues are significant. The medical model suggests that individuals should not be
held responsible for their diseases. But increasing
evidence that personal habits are a major factor in
illness underscores the role of personal responsibility for disease. Such habits as use of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs; diet; exercise; sleep patterns; and
sexual promiscuity contribute significantly to risk
of disease. In addition, compliance with treatment
has become an increasing source of professional
concern and research. All of this suggests that the
distinctions between medical and psychosocial
viewpoints may not be as clear-cut as the foregoing discussion might imply.
Analogies can be drawn between the various effects of sin in psychopathology and models of psychopathology. The presence of sin in the world is
most clearly reflected in the disease model, which
focuses on the physical basis for disorders. The effects of personal sin and to some extent the sins of
others seem consistent with the sociopsychological model. Finally, the systems model emphasizes
phenomena most consistent with problems stemming from the sinfulness of others.

Conclusions. The medical model has been helpful in some respects and has created problems in
others. However, the complexity and diversity of
phenomena included in DSM-IV require acknowledgment of multiple causal factors in mental disorders, and therefore the medical model alone is
inadequate. A comprehensive model of mental functioning must include the following components: biological factors, including genetic, anatomical, and
biochemical causes and infectious diseases; psychological factors, including personal, developmental, and family history, and relationships toothers; social factors such as societal and cultural
norms and standards; spiritual factors, including
personal sin, ethical and moral responsibilities, relationship to God, and spiritual growth a nd development. It is doubtful that any existing model is
able to fully encompass this diversity.
Medical considerations are essential to a full understanding of mental disorders, and further advances will likely be made through the medical approach. However, the medical model does not
encompass all of the phenomena included under
mental illness, and hence other models are required
as well. Perhaps an integrative model that brings
together elements from several of the present models will emerge. Alternatively, a comprehensive new
system may eventually develop. Such a model
should reflect the biopsychosocial and spiritual
complexity of human functioning.
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Mental Retardation. A condition affecting about
6.5 million people in the United States, in which the
individual's general intellectual functioning is significantly subaverage, adaptive behavior is impaired,
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